






CENTRO STUDI LUCA D’AGLIANO 
 
























* Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano and TEAM, Université de Paris I 
**University of Paris-Sud, CEPII, CERAS and CEPR Je t’aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade∗
Anne-C´ elia Disdier† Thierry Mayer‡
February 8, 2005
Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and opinions. It uses the
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys published by the European Commission, which provide
data on the share of the population in each EU member country in favor of each CEEC joining
the EU. Our results ﬁrst suggest that bilateral opinions have a statistically robust and relatively
large eﬀect on imports, even when standard and new covariates capturing proximity between
countries are controlled for. We interpret this eﬀect as reﬂecting a positive impact of “bilateral
aﬃnity” on trade patterns. We also show that it is possible to go some way towards explaining
the variance in bilateral opinions among our sample. Last we provide some preliminary attempt
to determine causality between bilateral opinions and imports.
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Proximity helps exchanges. This has been an enduring result in the literature since the gravitational
law has been proposed by economists as a description of the bilateral commodity ﬂows1. More
debate emerges when it comes to what is a good deﬁnition of proximity. Physical distance should
clearly enter this deﬁnition and always does, usually motivated as a proxy for transportation costs.
This primary (inversed) measure of proximity still matters a great deal in trade patterns: In a meta-
analysis on the impact of distance on bilateral trade, Disdier and Head (2004) report an average
elasticity estimate of -0.89, covering 1052 estimates in 78 studies. They also show that estimates
are in fact rising over time since the 1950s, a result arguing against naive expectations about the
current level of globalization.
More generally, the impact of proximity on trade can be divided into two components: The
reduction of transaction costs (freight, but also communication and information costs) and “bilateral
aﬃnity” between the two countries (which notably inﬂuences preferences of consumers). This aﬃnity
is itself generated by a complex mixture of exogenous “historical accidents” (good or bad) that arose
between the two countries, and more endogenous economic characteristics of the two countries.
Physical distance is clearly an imperfect and incomplete measure of this overall deﬁnition of
proximity. First, some elements of transaction costs are not directly related to distance (variations
in bilateral protectionist measures have no a priori reason to follow distance in a systematic way
for instance). Second, bilateral distance has all chances to be a poor measure of bilateral aﬃnity.
Consider the example of cultural proximity. We have all reasons to believe that countries sharing
similar cultural features have i) more proximate tastes, ii) lower communication and information costs
and iii) more trust that individuals in the other country will not adopt an opportunistic behavior in
contractual relationships as Guiso et al. (2004) emphasize. All of those will contribute to make trade
larger. Cultural proximity is likely to be correlated with physical distance, for the simple reason
that a lot of cultural features travel embodied in people, and that migrations are strongly impeded
by distance. It is however imperfectly captured by distance. Empirical support for this view can
be found in the literature about network eﬀects in international trade. This body of work recently
surveyed in Rauch (2001) and Wagner et al. (2002), has repeatedly found that bilateral migration
1Tinbergen, 1962, is often cited as the original study of this kind, but Isard and Peck, 1954, is an earlier study
using gravity determinants of trade ﬂows. Hundreds of papers have used the gravity model empirically since then.
1is a robust trade-promoting force, even after controlling for bilateral distance. The very robust
and large positive impact on trade ﬂows of common language and colonial links that are routinely
introduced in gravity equations, is a further sign that cultural aspects of proximity are important in
international commerce, in addition to distance. We use here a new type of information, the bilateral
opinions expressed by surveyed populations in European Union (EU) member countries about the
enlargement to Eastern European countries, to capture more precisely the impact of proximity on
trade patterns.
This research has been initially guided by the observation of ﬁgure 1. This ﬁgure provides
for each bilateral relationship between one EU country and one Central and Eastern European
Country (CEEC) included in our sample in 2000, the percentage of the population in the considered
EU country (before the enlargement of May 2004) favoring the enlargement given the distance
separating it from its CEEC partner. Each point of this ﬁgure represents one EU-CEEC bilateral
relationship and we separate the observations in two panels, one for “small” EU countries (less than
40m inhabitants) and one for “large” EU countries (more than 40m inhabitants). These opinions
seem indeed related to bilateral distances (specially for small EU countries), but physical proximity
is clearly not the only determinant. For instance, all opinions in Austria are clearly below the
European average, despite its relative geographical proximity with CEECs. We hence expect that
when introducing bilateral opinions in the set of explanatory variables of bilateral trade patterns, they
will i) reduce the independent impact of bilateral distance on trade, i) bring additional information
relevant to trade patterns.
Bilateral opinions are of course themselves not random. They are aﬀected by a host of diﬀerent
elements that we will investigate here, some of them stemming from non-economic characteristics of
the two countries, some of them deeply aﬀected by the endogenous economic environment, partic-
ularly in our case where the question asked relates to the desirability of enlargement and therefore
of international integration with a speciﬁc trade partner. The intensity of trade ﬂows is likely to
be one of those economic determinants of bilateral opinions. We can refer to this inﬂuence as the
“non-traditional” eﬀects of trade. The relationship between trade patterns and bilateral aﬃnity has
rarely been studied in the literature (Guiso et al., 2004 being a recent exception). Several channels
can be envisioned to the impact of trade on opinions, one stipulating that large trade volumes helps
diﬀuse information and cultural traits, reduce bilateral ignorances and fears, which might translate
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in better bilateral opinions everything else equal. A reverse argument can however also be used.
Opinions can be guided by fears of strengthened competition with the entry of candidate countries.
A large bilateral trade volume can thus yield an overall lower level of positive opinions under this
view, reﬂecting demand for protection. This phenomenon is likely to be all the more important that
the two countries are specialized in the same industry, in which case expectations of large adjustment
costs following the enlargement are high. This is emphasized in recent and related work by Mayda
and Rodrik (forthcoming), who ﬁnd using individual data that the demands for protectionism are
signiﬁcantly higher in industries most exposed to foreign competition. Regarding our sample of
countries, note that the number of anti-dumping investigations conducted by EU against CEECs
have signiﬁcantly increased at the end of the 90s. The number of anti-dumping initiations registered
only started to decrease substantially in 20022.
While our opinion data are not available at the individual level, they have the advantage of
having a bilateral dimension (and also a -short- temporal one). We use these data to investigate the
relationship between trade integration and bilateral opinions in both directions. We therefore try
to address the following questions: First, is there an inﬂuence of opinions on bilateral trade, even
after controlling for often used proximity variables? What are the determinants of those bilateral
opinions? We also investigate the potential causality and its direction using the drastic trade policy
changes over the period as an instrument for trade volumes.
23 new investigations were initiated in 1996, 5 in 1997, 6 in 1998, 8 in 1999, 6 in 2000, 7 in 2001, and 1 in 2002.
Since 2003 any new investigation has been initiated. Source: European Commission.
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The related empirical literature is presented
in section 2. The data are described in section 3. In section 4 we present our speciﬁcation and
report the results from the contemporaneous correlation. The method used for causality analysis
and results of this analysis are detailed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related empirical literature
2.1 Bilateral aﬃnity as a determinant of bilateral trade
Several forms of trade partners’ bilateral aﬃnity have been studied in the literature, with diﬀerent
mechanisms of inﬂuence. Two measures have quite a long history in the gravity equation literature:
Linguistic similarity and past colonial links.
International trade tends to be promoted by the linguistic proximity of countries. This ﬁnding
most often uses the simplest possible measure, a dummy variable set to one when the two countries
speak the same language. A typical estimate for this variable is 0.5 (Frankel, 1997 for instance),
which means that sharing a language increases trade ﬂows by around 65%. Boisso and Ferrantino
(1997) and Melitz (2003) have investigated continuous measures of linguistic similarity. The sample
used by Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) consists of about 8000 bilateral export ﬂows estimated year-by-
year for the period 1960-1985. Results of estimations show that bilateral trade tends to decrease with
the linguistic distance. The inﬂuence of this distance is however reduced by one third between 1971
and 1985. Melitz (2003) suggests a more detailed analysis and considers two diﬀerent measures of
the linguistic proximity of trade partners. The ﬁrst one aims to capture the linguistic communication
network and the second measure refers to the direct communication between individuals3. Results
of estimations on a very large sample of countries and at ﬁve-years interval over the period 1970-
1995 conﬁrm the positive inﬂuence of shared languages on bilateral trade. Estimated coeﬃcients on
both measures of linguistic proximity are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Junius and Nitsch
(2001) also investigate the impact of language on trade through the inclusion of a bilateral ethno-
linguistic fragmentation variable in a gravity study. They ﬁnd that the product of ethno-linguistic
3The ﬁrst measure is evaluated by a dummy variable set to one if both countries have the same oﬃcial language
or if a language is possessed by at least 20% of the population of each country. Note that this measure is partially
equivalent to the dummy variable “common language” usually introduced in the estimations. The second measure is
calculated by adding, for all the languages possessed by at least 4% of the population in each country, the products of
the shares of speakers of each language.
4fragmentation of partner countries has a positive impact on trade and interpret this as evidence of
the importance of cultural proximity in reducing search costs.
Colonial links have also been shown to be trade-enhancing. Several channels can again be envi-
sioned. First, colonizing powers have usually established trade networks in the colonized countries
and those networks can persist even after the colonial episode. The importance of formal and in-
formal networks in international trade has been recently emphasized4, and colonial links may have
helped establish persistent networks. Second, being colonized often involves adoption of the institu-
tional framework of the colonizer (with some variance depending on the colonizer and the colonized
country as emphasized by Acemoglu et al., 2001). Such institutions involve legal rules and ad-
ministrative systems that can aﬀect the ease of international trade through an improvement in the
security of transactions or a reduction in communication costs due to similarity in the institutional
framework. Note that this can explain why an ancient colony still trades more than expected5 with
its ex-colonizer, but also why two countries having had the same colonizer have larger than expected
bilateral trade ﬂows. Rose (2000) has implemented this using dummies for historical colonial links
and for the fact that the two countries has had the same colonizer. The impacts found are extremely
large. In his benchmark results for 1990, the colonial relationship raises bilateral trade by a factor
of exp(1.75) = 5.75, everything else equal, while having had a common colonizer make countries’
bilateral trade exp(0.59) − 1 = 80% larger. It is interesting to note also that those coeﬃcients were
substantially larger for the year 19706.
Linked to this literature is the body of work studying the existence of business and social network
eﬀects in trade, through the estimation of the explanatory power of international migrations patterns
on bilateral trade. Wagner et al. (2003) provide a comparison of this set of papers analyzing the
immigration-trade link. Immigrants promote exchanges between their origin and host countries
in several ways. The ﬁrst one is linked to a diﬀusion-of-tastes eﬀect: Immigrants keep at least
part of their preference for goods produced in their origin country, which generates an additional
demand. Presumably, some locals will also acquire tastes of immigrants on a certain number of
4See Rauch (2001) for an overview of this literature.
5Expected in the sense of predicted by the gravity equation, i.e. given the economic sizes of both trade partners
and the distance between them.
6Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) also illustrate this inﬂuence. Their research on bilateral trade between countries
of the former British Empire and of the British Commonwealth, between the United States and the Philippines, and
between the Netherlands and the Indonesia for the years 1949, 1954 and 1964 conﬁrms that these colonial links have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on trade.
5goods. Therefore, if the presence of immigrants is to promote bilateral trade, this channel predicts
an eﬀect on imports of the host country and above all for trade in ﬁnal goods and diﬀerentiated
goods. Immigrants also bring with them additional information about trade opportunities and
demand characteristics in their origin country. They are also connected to the business networks of
their origin country, and their better knowledge of the origin country, especially in terms of language,
culture and legal framework, entails a reduction in transaction costs. Those last elements should
mostly inﬂuence trade in diﬀerentiated goods, where immigrants’ informational advantage is largest.
Note that they can have an impact on trade in both directions. The empirical results often ﬁnd
more robust and large estimates for the immigration - exports linkage, providing support for the
information channel, rather than the diﬀusion of preferences.
Another form of proximity between countries is the political one. The relationship between
this type of proximity and trade has, to the best of our knowledge, never been investigated in
the gravity-like literature. There is a debate among political scientists as to whether bilateral
trade has an inﬂuence on the most extreme form of bilateral political relationship: Armed conﬂicts
(Barbieri, 2002, is a recent example of such work surveying this literature). However, the impact of
political proximity on trade seems to be still uncovered. Some historical examples suggest that the
improvement of political relationships between countries promotes economic integration. The process
of European integration represents probably the best illustration. The European construction was
primarily based on the political will of some countries to improve what had been quite tumultuous
international relations in the area even if its fulﬁlment has afterwards taken place in the economic
ﬁeld. Diﬀerent methods could be considered for evaluating this proximity, we use here the measure
of bilateral vote correlation at the United Nations developed by political scientists.
Last and most related to our work, is the very recent paper by Guiso et al. (2004) on bilateral
trust and economic exchanges. They use the Eurobarometer survey, as we do here, but they rely on
answers to a diﬀerent question, the one about the level of bilateral trust between citizens of diﬀerent
countries. Their main argument is that bilateral trust is built in each country through a process
in which cultural biases are important, and those later inﬂuence bilateral economic relationships.
Indeed lack of bilateral trust make people reluctant in starting a contractual relationship, which in
return forbids the level of knowledge of potential partners in the other country to increase, and hence
trust can never reach a level where trade or investment is expected to be proﬁtable. Introducing this
6variable in bilateral trade and FDI equations, they ﬁnd a robust positive impact of trust on trade
ﬂows, less so on FDI.
2.2 The determinants of opinions
How are bilateral opinions determined? They can themselves clearly be related to a certain number
of country-speciﬁc and dyad-speciﬁc characteristics of the two countries. The existing literature
has used individual level opinions on the protectionist sentiment (Mayda and Rodrik, forthcoming,
O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001) and on the will in candidate countries to enter the EU (Doyle and
Fidrmuc, 2004). They therefore only have “non-dyadic opinions” which they try to explain with
“non-dyadic opinions” determinants.
A large number of such determinants have been proposed in those papers. They refer to the
economic characteristics of countries and individuals (using essentially information on endowments
and industries) and to the non-economic perceptions by citizens. Our research is here closely related
to the one by Mayda and Rodrik (forthcoming) on the determinants of individual opinions in relation
to international trade.7 Several results are of direct interest for our work. First, people with a
high level of education and skill disagree strongly with trade restrictions only if their country is
human capital abundant. Besides, the degree of trade openness of the sector in which an individual
is employed seems to inﬂuence his opinion. People belonging to non-traded sectors are more in
favor of international trade. Among the traded sectors, individuals in sectors with a comparative
disadvantage are more protectionist. A positive relation exists also between the social status8 and
opinions in favor of international trade. Last, these individual opinions are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by various noneconomic elements: every thing else equal, individuals strongly attached to their
neighborhood and to their country are more protectionists. On the other hand, those who have
greater conﬁdence in political and economic institutions appear more open to international trade.
Doyle and Fidrmuc (2004) study the results of an opinion poll conducted in March/April 2002 in
which citizens from 13 candidate countries in Eastern Europe are asked whether they would vote
for or against EU membership in a referendum. They ﬁnd that a high level of education, youth,
a relatively high income, and living in an urban area increases the support for EU membership,
7Individual trade preferences are also studied by O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001). The main results of interest for us
are similar to those obtained by Mayda and Rodrik (forthcoming).
8Either deﬁned in terms of relative income or the subjective perception of it.
7while individuals who should beneﬁt from the EU redistribution system surprisingly do not support
membership. Contrary to the two previous papers, Doyle and Fidrmuc (2004) however do not really
consider whether the trade theory predictions are backed up by opinions.
Compared to this literature explaining opinions, we have here a bilateral dimension in the data.
For example, we know the percentage of Italians supporting the enlargement to Bulgaria and the
one in favor of the enlargement to Hungary. This additional dimension allows to focus on new deter-
minants. Consider for instance panel (b) of our ﬁgure 1. Italy seems to be a country where opinions
about the enlargement are particularly favorable. However there is quite a lot of variance among
candidate countries, the opinion being 58% positive in 2000 with respect to Poland membership
against only 41% for the three Baltic States. Such bilateral variance can be even more important.
For the same year, the level of support for Romanian membership ranges from 13% in Austria to
56% in Greece.
Guiso et al. (2004) attempt to explain how bilateral trust is built between two nations. They
also incorporate ﬁxed eﬀects for each of the two countries in the relationship to account for nation-
speciﬁc characteristics that do not vary over time and makes a country more likely to trust or to be
trusted (its long term history of warfare for instance). Their main determinants of trust in terms of
signiﬁcance are the commonality of legal origin, genetic distance, which probably capture a common
origin region of both populations, a common history, large population exchanges... The impact of
a variable capturing the level of information (number of times the name of the other country is
cited in the newspapers) is negative when statistically signiﬁcant, which they interpret as a negative
bias spread by newspapers when they talk about a country. The data used by Guiso et al. (2004)
have a bilateral dimension but their study does not include economic determinants of trust. Our
contribution can therefore be seen as an intermediate between this type of analysis and the one about
protectionist opinions seen above. We bridge the two types of work by studying bilateral opinions
about economic integration.
3 Data
Our empirical implementation uses annual data for European countries (14 EU countries and 10
Applicant countries). We have data for seven years: 1992, 1994, and from 1997 to 2001. Separated
statistical series for Belgium and Luxembourg have been unavailable until recently (notably on trade
8ﬂows), we exclude Luxembourg from the sample of opinions, its weight in the trade ﬂows of Belgium-
Luxembourg is usually very low. Besides, Austria, Finland and Sweden are considered in the survey
only since their membership and therefore only appear in our sample starting in 1997. The ten
CEECs are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three
Baltic States, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Bilateral trade data - between each EU country and each CEEC - consist mostly in aggregated
ﬂows (industry-level data are considered in the last part of the paper). Data come from Eurostat, us-
ing data from the IMF leaves estimates virtually unchanged. In order to uncover potential diﬀerences
depending on the direction of the trade ﬂow, the relationship between trade and opinions is studied
separately for imports and exports. Our measure of opinions is extracted from the Eurobarometer
public opinion surveys published by the European Commission. These biannual9 surveys have been
conducted since 1973 in each Member State. They present an analysis of public opinion towards the
European Union (European institutions, enlargement, support for European construction, etc.). An
identical set of questions is asked to representative samples of the population aged ﬁfteen years and
over in each Member State. All interviews are face-to-face in people’s home and in the appropriate
national language. The regular sample consists of 1000 people per country with some exceptions10.
Our measure of opinions is based on the following question:
For each of the following countries, would you be in favor of or against it becoming part
of the European Union?
Countries cited in the list are the 10 applicant CEECs, Cyprus, Malta, and (according to the
year of the survey) Turkey, other Eastern European countries (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia) and Western European countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and—before their
membership—Austria, Finland and Sweden). For reasons of sample homogeneity, our empirical
implementation covers only the ten CEECs. Possible answers are “In favour”, “Against”, “Don’t
know”. Results are expressed as a percentage of the total of the answers. The deﬁnition of our
opinion variable is based on the percentage of positive answers; in the estimations, these values are
drawn into the interval [0;100]. Questions appearing in the Eurobarometer surveys are however not
asked at regular intervals. The availability of the chosen question for the evaluation of opinions
9These surveys are conducted each Spring and Autumn.
10Current exceptions are for Luxembourg (600), the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern
Ireland), and Germany (2000 people: 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany).
9limits our analysis to the years 1992, 1994 and from 1997 to 2001. Besides, trade data being annual,
we retain the mean of the answers from the spring and autumn surveys.
Table 1 summarizes the opinions’ data in each EU country. Average opinions by EU country are
calculated for three groups of CEECs. The ﬁrst group (group A) includes the most economically
advanced transition countries, namely Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia;
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) constitute a group (group B) of their own; last,
Bulgaria and Romania for the third group (group C). For each group, the average opinion expressed
in 2001 and variations of this opinion for the sub-periods 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 are reported in
the table. Average opinions and their variations are expressed in percentage.
Table 1: Opinions of EU citizens towards adhesion of CEECs (%)
Country Group A Group B Group C
Opinion ∆01/97 ∆97/92 Opinion ∆01/97 ∆97/92 Opinion ∆01/97 ∆97/92
in 2001 in 2001 in 2001
Austria 44.8 19.3 35.7 28.3 24 33.3
Belgium 43.4 46.6 -31.8 40.7 59.6 -34.5 37.5 44.3 -40.9
Denmark 62.2 6.8 50.4 70.3 -1.2 14.8 45.5 2.3 43.7
Finland 48 -2.7 60 5.2 34 -9.7
France 28.8 -11.8 -21.8 20.3 -13.5 -31.5 26 -16.1 -25.9
Germany 42.8 26.5 -19.4 41.3 41 -38 27.5 39.6 -39.7
Great Britain 38.6 -1.3 -16.9 33 -5.3 -9.1 35.5 -5.3 -11.7
Greece 62.6 12 36.9 57 17.5 50.1 61.5 7 16.3
Ireland 45.2 12.8 11.7 41 12.4 14.2 42 5.1 -5.9
Italy 49.2 9.6 -9.7 39.3 10.3 -8.5 46 9.5 -12.2
The Netherlands 48 -16.6 10.2 47.7 -10.9 -1.3 38.5 -19.8 9.2
Portugal 47 24.2 -10.4 42.3 26.4 -4.2 47.5 26.7 -25.8
Spain 51.2 6.3 -2.5 48 9.9 4 50.5 1.5 -1.5
Sweden 69.8 17.4 76.3 13.4 59.5 23.3
EU average 48.7 46.6 41.1
Notes : Group A: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; group B: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania;
group C: Bulgaria and Romania. Opinions and their variations are in %.
First, we note that the average support for enlargement varies depending on which country you
ask them should join (49% for group A, 47% for group B and only 41% for group C). Support for
enlargement varies also between the Member States. Interestingly, people in Sweden, followed by
people in Greece and Denmark, tend to be most supportive. On the opposite, people France and the
United Kingdom tend to be the least supportive in 2001. This ﬁrst pattern shows that controlling
for structural diﬀerences in the level of support in each Western European country and also for the
average level of support towards each CEEC will be crucial, and we will include country speciﬁc
10ﬁxed eﬀects as a consequence.
As was already seen graphically in the introduction, the bilateral dimension of data on opinions
shows an inﬂuence of spatial proximity of countries: Support for Bulgaria and Romania is signiﬁ-
cantly above EU average in Greece. People in Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland and Sweden)
are more likely to support the membership of Baltic States and this support is higher than the one
observed for countries of group A. Last, note that diﬀerences in terms of favorable opinion tend to
increase between countries of group C and countries of groups A and B in several cases over the
period 1997-2001.
Figure 2 provides the distribution of public opinion in favor to the enlargement in each EU
country. All the observations of our sample are presented irrespective of year or CEECs partner.
For each value, the length of the horizontal line is a function of the number of observations. The
lighter horizontal line represents the average value. This ﬁgure also shows the opinion’s concentration
in each country. Bilateral opinions are highly concentrated in Spain and on the opposite highly
dispersed in Austria and Denmark. This ﬁgure conﬁrms and extends over the whole period some
of the results of Table 1. In particular, Denmark and Sweden, followed by Greece, are again the
highest supporters of the enlargement.
4 Models and Results
4.1 The inﬂuence of bilateral opinions on trade
Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the standard new trade monopolistic competition-
CES demand-Iceberg trade costs model ﬁrst introduced by Krugman (1980) and used by many since
then. Producers operating under increasing returns in each country produce diﬀerentiated varieties
that they ship, with a cost, to consumers in all countries. Parameter φij measures the bilateral free-
ness of trade between country i and country j, involving both actual price-raising trade impediments
and the sensitivity of consumers to an increase in price. The utility function contains a preference
term aij representing “bilateral love” of consumers in j for varieties produced in i. The total value
of exports from i to j can be written in logs as (see Redding and Venables, 2004 for instance):
lnxij = ln(nip1−σ
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Figure 2: Bilateral opinions expressed in each EU country in favour of enlargement
with ni and pi the number of varieties and prices in country i, Yj and Pj representing the expenditure
and price index of the importer country. The gravity equation can be seen as a reduced form of this
theoretical trade ﬂow prediction, where the (logged) output of country i proxies for the ﬁrst term,
and the (logged) income of j approximates the last one. Distance, common language and contiguity
are usually used for lnφij + (σ − 1)lnaij. While nip1−σ
i and YjPσ−1
j are not totally disconnected
from the two GDPs of i and j respectively, they are crude approximations at the best, raising issues
on the validity of simple gravity speciﬁcations and results.
A speciﬁcation more consistent with theory involves the use of ﬁxed eﬀects for each importer and
exporter (Hummels, 1999 and Redding and Venables, 2004 use this method, notably recommended
by Feenstra, 2004, in his recent textbook). The ﬁxed eﬀects fei and fej incorporate the size eﬀects
as in gravity, but also the other origin and destination determinants seen above, the price and the
number of varieties of the exporting country and the size of demand and the price index (often
referred to as a remoteness term) of the importing country:
lnxij = fei + lnφij + (σ − 1)lnaij + fej. (2)
12We will therefore mostly use this speciﬁcation together with simple gravity.11 Theory predicts unitary
income elasticities. Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we impose a unit coeﬃcient on
income variables in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations by dividing trade volumes by the product of both
partners’ GDPs.
The last step is to specify free-ness of trade and bilateral preferences, φij and aij. Trade costs
that reduce φij, are usually seen as consisting of transport costs, protection measures, and infor-
mation/communication costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Bilateral distance and common
border are standard proxies for transport costs. Bilateral tariﬀs will be used here (in a later part
of the article) as a measure of trade policy. We use two variables to proxy for information channels
about proﬁtable trade opportunities between the two countries. We ﬁrst use bilateral exchanges of
newspapers as a proxy for the ease of communication and quality of reciprocal information. Re-
cent evidence on the impact of business and social networks on trade patterns has also shown that
migrants reduce the information costs related to international trade.
lnφij = δ1 lndij + δ2cbij − (σ − 1)lntarij + δ3 lnnewsij + δ4 lnasylumij. (3)
Distance (dij) between trade partners is deﬁned as the sum of the bilateral distances between
the biggest cities of countries weighted by the economic sizes of those cities. City population is used
as weight. These distances are made available by the CEPII12. cbij is a dummy variable set to 1 for
pairs of countries that share a common border. Tariﬀs come from amended version of Jon Haveman’s
compilation of TRAINS. Flows of newspapers are extracted from COMTRADE database. asylumij
is the share of asylum seekers going to a particular EU member during the period 1988-1993. Data
come from Eurostat. Note that data quality for migrations is relatively poor and some values of this
variable are missing.
Often, aij is speciﬁed and simpliﬁed as a home bias, mostly because no bilateral information on
preferences is available to the researcher. One of our objectives in this paper is to provide a richer
speciﬁcation of bilateral preferences. A ﬁrst set of proxy variables identiﬁes characteristics that can
11Alternatively, the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the CES can be used for estimation (Head



























This method is also consistent with theory and we will use it in the last parts of this paper.
12www.cepii.fr
13make tastes of consumers more similar and hence augment the quality of the match between varieties
produced in i and tastes of consumers in j. A cultural similarity variable that has been largely used
and can proxy for similar preferences is common language. Note that linguistic proximity is hard to
measure in our sample: The introduction of a dummy variable is indeed not appropriate because no
single pair of countries share a common language in this sample. The use of a continuous measure of
the linguistic distance between countries as in Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) or Melitz (2003) is also
hard: Similarity indexes are available for a insuﬃcient number of countries and/or only treats Indo-
European languages and therefore totally ignores the three Finno-Ugric languages also present in
our sample. We use a richer variable of proximity of languages spoken langij, that takes into account
the language “families” established by linguists13 and uses the product of the share of populations
speaking a speciﬁc language in each of the two trading partners. For each language, we ﬁrst consider
its family and sub-family. For example, French and English are Indo-European languages. Regarding
their sub-families, French belongs to the Italic languages and English to the Germanic ones. We
then deﬁne a language similarity’s index which takes the value of 1 if both countries have the same
language, 0.5 if the two languages belong to the same sub-family, 0.25 if the two languages belong to
two diﬀerent sub-families but to the same family and 0 for two languages from two diﬀerent families.
Finally, the linguistic proximity between two countries is calculated by adding, for all the languages
spoken by at least 3% of the population in each country, the products of the shares of speakers
in each country weighted by the language similarity index. In addition, we control for the bilateral
trade in printed books (source: COMTRADE), that should also be related to common cultural traits
and therefore similar tastes of consumers.
lnaij = α1langij + α2 lnbooksij, (4)
The next step is to introduce the bilateral opinions’ variables in the trade equation. The expected
eﬀect depends of course on how bilateral opinions are formed. As described in greater details in the
next section, we envision several determinants of bilateral opinions on the question under study here.
Opinions will reﬂect dimensions of both aij and φij. A long history of violent warfare between i and
j is likely to attach a negative image to all products coming from the “ancestral enemy”, reducing
aij, but also to make communication and negotiation of contracts more diﬃcult, which reduces φij.
13www.ethnologue.com
14We therefore introduce the variable opinij, which measures the bilateral opinions, as described in a
preceding section and have the following expectations: 1) The impact on trade should be positive, 2)
The impact should be larger on imports than on exports because the bilateral aﬃnity has no reason
to be strictly reciprocal14, 3) Variables proxying for aij and φij should see their inﬂuence reduced
when they imperfectly proxy for bilateral aﬃnity, like for distance for instance.
The estimated equations are therefore:
lnxij = β0 + β1 lnyi + β2 lnyj
+δ1 lndij + δ2cbij − (σ − 1)lntarij + δ3 lnnewsij + δ4 lnasylumij
+α1langij + α2 lnbooksij + γ lnopinij + ij, (5)
ln(xij/yiyj) = fei + fej
+δ1 lndij + δ2cbij − (σ − 1)lntarij + δ3 lnnewsij + δ4 lnasylumij
+α1langij + α2 lnbooksij + γ lnopinij + ij, (6)
where economic sizes of both countries in the simple gravity equation (yi, yj) are measured with
their respective GDP. In our sample i = 1,...,n is one of the candidate countries, and j = 1,...,N
is a EU member (before May 1st, 2004). We also run estimations on xji, the imports of candidate
countries from EU members. Year dummies are also introduced in all our estimations. Results of
the estimations are reported in Table 2 for imports and Table 3 for exports.
The ﬁrst three columns of Tables 2 and 3 report results for imports and exports with simple
gravity estimation and heteroscedasticity corrected with White’s (1980) method. Fixed eﬀects es-
timation results—our preferred estimates because of the consistency with underlying theory—are
reported in columns (4), (5) and (6). The overall high ﬁt of regressions is consistent with what
is found in the literature. Regarding usual covariates, the impact of distance is stronger than the
usual estimates but this comes from the fact that our sample mainly covers combinations of trading
14To take a well known example: Guiso et al. (2004) report that the level of bilateral trust between British and
French citizens is quite below the average level of trust those two countries inspire to other countries on average. What
is more unexpected is that the level of dis-trust of British citizens for French ones is more than twice the reverse level.
15Table 2: Inﬂuence of bilateral opinions on EU imports
Dep. Variable: Imports Ln (imports/product of GDPs)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intcpt -9.62a -11.65a -12.17a -10.09a -11.58a -11.85a
(0.86) (0.91) (0.97) (0.70) (1.02) (1.11)
ln GDP EU country 0.96a 0.99a 1.01a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln GDP CEEC 0.72a 0.70a 0.72a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ln distance -1.43a -1.40a -1.43a -2.18a -2.11a -2.09a
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
common border 0.37a 0.44a 0.44a 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ln imports of newspapers 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01c -0.01c -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln share asylum seekers 0.15a 0.15a 0.16a 0.07b 0.06b 0.08b
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
language proximity index -0.37 -0.26 -0.34 1.18a 1.05a 0.94a
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.34)
ln imports of books 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01b 0.01b 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln bilateral opinion 0.36a 0.32b
(0.08) (0.16)
ln bilateral opinion (lagged) 0.39a 0.38b
(0.09) (0.17)
EU countries ﬁxed eﬀects no no no yes yes yes
CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects no no no yes yes yes
Time eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 679 679 585 679 679 585
R2 0.858 0.861 0.866 0.784 0.786 0.783
RMSE 0.705 0.698 0.688 0.578 0.576 0.575
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
a,
b and
c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
16Table 3: Inﬂuence of bilateral opinions on EU exports
Dep. Variable: Exports Ln (exports/product of GDPs)
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intcpt -7.13a -7.73a -8.41a -11.34a -13.35a -10.85a
(0.74) (0.89) (0.87) (0.63) (1.06) (0.92)
ln GDP EU country 0.91a 0.92a 1.00a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln GDP CEEC 0.70a 0.70a 0.73a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln distance -1.64a -1.63a -1.70a -1.98a -1.88a -2.00a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
common border -0.16 -0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ln exports of newspapers 0.02a 0.02a 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln share asylum seekers 0.10a 0.10a 0.10a 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
language proximity index -0.86a -0.83a -0.91a 0.45c 0.29 0.36
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.30)
ln exports of books 0.02b 0.02b 0.01b 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln bilateral opinion 0.10 0.42b
(0.08) (0.18)
ln bilateral opinion (lagged) 0.08 0.07
(0.08) (0.14)
EU countries ﬁxed eﬀects no no no yes yes yes
CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects no no no yes yes yes
Time eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 679 679 585 679 679 585
R2 0.896 0.896 0.912 0.842 0.844 0.875
RMSE 0.638 0.638 0.584 0.531 0.528 0.450
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
a,
b and
c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
17partners involving ground transportation.15 Sharing a common border promotes EU imports from
CEECs in the gravity equation, but the eﬀect is not robust, and is basically nil for exports to the
CEECs.
Column (2) of Table 2 introduces bilateral opinions in the simple gravity framework, and we
also account for a potential simultaneity bias between the changes in trade and bilateral opinions
by including the lagged value of bilateral opinion in column (3). Point estimates of the bilateral
opinion variable are quite stable across speciﬁcations. Coeﬃcients of columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)
reveals that a 10% rise in the level of positive bilateral opinion is associated with a rise in trade
volumes between 3.2% and 3.9%. In our sample, a one standard deviation increase in the opinions
variable from the mean value amounts to a 29% rise in the level of positive opinions, which raises
bilateral trade by a ﬁgure ranging between 9.3% and 11.3%. The magnitude of the eﬀect is therefore
substantial in economic terms, in line with the estimates obtained by Guiso et al. (2004) with trust
as an explanatory variable, and highly statistically signiﬁcant. Regressions also reveal that bilateral
opinions bring additional information in the explanation of trade patterns, rather than substituting
for the impact other variables proxying φij and aij. Indeed, most of the variables keep a stable
coeﬃcient with the inclusion of bilateral opinions in the gravity speciﬁcation. Note that the asylum
seekers variable has a robust impact on trade ﬂows and contribute substantially to the overall ﬁt
of the regression. With the lowest estimates of Table 2, a one-standard deviation increase from the
mean of this variable raises bilateral trade by more than 11 percent. We also test if our results are
aﬀected by our measure of migration. We use the stock of migrants from CEECs in EU countries
(available from the OECD international migration statistics) as an alternative measure of migration.
Results, not reported here, suggest a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of migration on
trade and the inﬂuence of bilateral opinion on trade remains unchanged. The ﬁt of the regression
is however slightly smaller. In the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, exchanges of books have a signiﬁcant
positive impact on trade, whereas the ﬂows of newspapers never have16.
Comparing results from Tables 2 and 3, we see that our main variable of interest loses its positive
inﬂuence for exports in all except one estimations, which conﬁrms priors if this variable mostly reﬂects
15Disdier and Head (2004) ﬁnd that distance estimates from gravity equations are substantially larger (in absolute
value) for intra-continental samples.
16Note that due to time constraints, newspapers can also be directly printed in the host country, specially when the
potential readership is large there. However, we do not think that this is a signiﬁcant concern in our case. Indeed, our
sample includes several small countries (in particular in Eastern Europe) and the market for newspapers from these
countries does not seem large enough to make direct investment advantageous.
18preferences of consumers. Opinions have no reason to reﬂect systematically symmetrical bilateral
aﬃnity, and we do not have the information on opinions of CEEC citizens on EU countries. The
diﬀerence in coeﬃcients can therefore be interpreted as evidence that the underlying mechanism
is indeed related to the aﬃnity that consumers in the importing country have for the exporting
country. Opinions are overall signiﬁcant and quite large determinants of imports in our sample.
Their inﬂuence is robust to the inclusion of other proxies for similar preferences and low trade costs
we use here, suggesting that it contains additional information on the bilateral aﬃnity of countries
that translate into higher trade ﬂows.
4.2 Determinants of bilateral opinions
The formation of opinions can be caused by several diﬀerent factors. We separate determinants of
opinions in a set reﬂecting bilateral aﬃnity on the one hand and another one reﬂecting the expected
economic gains / losses expected by the population from the enlargement. Additionally, we will
always consider for each group of regressions, a ﬁxed eﬀect estimation, in order to account for the
unobservable (but strong, see the country-speciﬁc patterns in ﬁgure 1) systematic country-speciﬁc
deviations in opinions. All estimations again include year dummies.
One can think that bilateral aﬃnity is primarily constructed by the history of the dyad under
consideration. Ancient alliances, intense bilateral migration ﬂows or repeated instances of political
and/or cultural conﬂicts should impact the feeling of citizens about each candidate countries. We
use several proxies to capture those historical ties likely to inﬂuence opinions. First, we use the
number of military incidents (warij) between the two countries within the period 1870-1989, and
uncorrij which measures the correlation between countries’ positions during votes on resolutions in
the General Assembly of the United Nations. The data on wars come from the Correlates Of War
project database maintained by political scientists.17 The UN votes correlation is intended to take
into account shorter term political proximity. This measure is based on the roll-call votes. This form
of vote happens when one Member State requests the recording of the vote so that its stand, or the
stand of another Member State, on the issue under discussion is clearly identiﬁed. This recording
must be requested before the voting is conducted. This annual database created by Gartzke et al.
(1999) covers the period 1946-1996. We take the mean value of annual correlation in the votes of the
17http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
19two trading partners between 1991 and 1996. As another proxy for cultural and historical ties, we
also use an index of religious proximity (religij), constructed in a very similar way as the language
similarity index.
Bilateral aﬃnity can also be measured by variables used for trade costs and similarity of prefer-
ences in the trade equation. A good example is our migration variable. It can proxy an information
channel for proﬁtable trading opportunities, but also bilateral aﬃnity of each EU country towards
each acceding country. Indeed, during the “immediate transition period” (which we date to be be-
tween 1988 and 1993 here), we expect asylum seekers trying to change citizenship and move out
of the Eastern Europe country considered to choose the EU country where its chances of positive
answer and then integration, success in professional and personal life... are highest (see Hatton,
2004, for recent evidence). The share of asylum seekers going to a particular EU member at this
period should therefore reﬂect in part the bilateral aﬃnity of countries. We therefore include those
variables for aij and φij as controls here.
The dependent variable is the percentage of respondents in each Member State that supports
the enlargement to a given CEEC. These percentages belong to the interval [0;100]. We take into
account the existence of those upper and lower bounds of the explained variable using a logistic
transformation of the data (Greene, 2003). Results of estimations using the ﬁrst group of variables
- bilateral aﬃnity variables - are reported in Table 4.
Results of the estimation based on OLS are presented in column (1). As expected, distance has
a negative and robust impact on bilateral opinions. Political proximity (UN votes correlation) and
contiguity have a more surprising impact. Contiguity has a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence, and
political proximity a non signiﬁcant and weak positive inﬂuence. The result on contiguity, surprising
at ﬁrst sight, becomes clearer when recalling the general features of the data. Figure 2 shows indeed
that Austrian and German citizens are relatively not favorable to the enlargement. However, Austria
share a border with four states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia; Germany has a
common border with the Czech Republic and Poland. On the other extreme, Denmark and Sweden,
in which support for enlargement is the highest, do not share any land border with CEECs. The
overall ﬁt of the regression is furthermore disappointing. Country speciﬁcities seem particularly
important in opinion formation and suggests the inclusion of EU countries and CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects
in columns (2) and (3). Results in those columns improve largely for the bilateral variables and come
20Table 4: Inﬂuence of aﬃnity factors on bilateral opinions
Dep. Variable: bilateral opinion
Model : (1) (2) (3)
intcpt 1.48 -10.72a -15.08a
(0.92) (2.54) (3.29)
nb of conﬂict years -0.04a -0.01a -0.02a
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ln UN vote correlation 0.20 2.93a 3.75a
(0.19) (0.55) (0.71)
religion proximity index -0.23a -0.20b -0.28b
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
ln distance -0.33a -0.49a -0.42a
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
common border -0.44a -0.04 0.07
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
ln share asylum seekers 0.04a
(0.02)
ln imports of newspapers 0.00
(0.00)
language proximity index 0.59a
(0.12)
ln imports of books 0.00
(0.00)
EU countries ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes
CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes
Time eﬀects yes yes yes
N 887 887 695
R2 0.168 0.784 0.802
RMSE 0.486 0.251 0.252
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
a and
b respec-
tively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels.
21back in line with expectations: Geographical proximity (a short distance and contiguity), combined
with high levels of political proximity, linguistic aﬃnity and of our asylum variable are all positively
associated with more positive opinions, once the country speciﬁcities have been taken into account.
Also, and unlike the estimations in the previous section, the R2 is also much higher when ﬁxed eﬀects
are included in the regression. Religious proximity has a negative sign contrary to expectations.
Bilateral aﬃnity variables explain a proportion of EU citizens’ opinions on enlargement, but the
crucial importance of ﬁxed eﬀects point to a large inﬂuence of ﬁxed characteristics of each country
(EU members and CEECs).
As a second step, we consider economic determinants of opinions. If citizens respond in a rational
way to the survey, they should take into account the expected change in their economic situation after
the enlargement to each country. Following the same idea as in Mayda and Rodrik (forthcoming)
or O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), we can expect for instance that unskilled workers in a skilled labor
abundant country will be all the more worried and therefore express negative opinions that the
enlargement concerns an unskilled labor abundant country. High expected costs of adjustment to
the enlargement will translate into more negative opinions. Note that the negative impact of distance
seen above runs against this argument, as countries should fear proximate countries under this logic,
with which trade will be larger after enlargement. We include two variables to capture this cost of
adjustment determinant, the trade ﬂows divided by the product of partners’ GDPs in each direction,
and the diﬀerence in GDP per capita. The impact of imports is particularly interesting here, a
negative sign would provide support for the political economy explanation of opinion formation,
while a positive one would suggest that increased trade contribute to raise bilateral aﬃnity.
The size of the EU country is also taken into account, as it seems to be a crucial empirical
determinant of the levels of opinions.18 The current rate of unemployment might also contribute
to fears of job losses in the diﬀerent member countries after the enlargement. Net contributions to
the EU budget might also matter, although the sign of the eﬀect is uncertain. The current level of
aid received from the European Commission under the regional policy programmes could generate
negative opinions about the enlargement, as enlargement might endanger those programmes and
redirect them to the CEECs. On the opposite, large net contributors might fear extended payments
18This variable can be justiﬁed with the well documented fact that large countries are less open to international
trade and investment.
22to be made to the new entrants. We include net contributions divided by country’s GDP as a
covariate as well as the amount of agriculture-related subsidies received (per farmer), which is often
a key political issue in European countries. Related to this is the overall perception by citizens of
the beneﬁts their country enjoyed from membership. People might be more supportive of further
integration if they view the history of the EU to date as globally positive for their country. We
therefore include an additional question of the Eurobarometer survey on this topic:
“Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance
beneﬁted or not from being a member of the European Union?”
Possible answers are: “Beneﬁted”, “Not beneﬁted” or “Don’t know”. We retain the percentage of
positive answers. Interestingly, this perceived beneﬁt is in fact one of the most robust determinant
of positive opinions. The estimations of the inﬂuence of economic determinants on bilateral opinions
are presented in table 5.
The ﬁrst four columns introduce imports and the next four exports. Columns (1) and (5) present
OLS results and the other ones, ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates. Columns (4) and (8) include lagged values
of imports and exports. Imports and exports always have a positive and very signiﬁcant inﬂuence
in statistical terms. Furthermore, following the use of lagged values for these variables and the
introduction of additional variables and/or of ﬁxed eﬀects, the inﬂuence of trade variables tends to
increase. Results of estimations indicate that the diﬀerence in GDP per capita between the two
countries has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on opinions, even when including ﬁxed eﬀects. EU citizens
therefore have a better opinion concerning the membership of a candidate country when this country
is proximate in terms of development level. The coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate in the EU
country is however not signiﬁcant, which suggests that a deterioration of the economic conjoncture in
the EU country does not deteriorate the opinions concerning the enlargement, everything else equal.
This suggests that EU citizens did not attribute a bad employment situation in their country to
economic relationships with candidate countries.19 Net contributions to the EU budget are positively
associated with opinions about the enlargement, which means that countries receiving the most from
the EU have the worst opinions about the enlargement. The fears of a reduction of EU subsidies
seem to be a strong determinant of opinions across countries. The agricultural subsidies variable (not
19This can be related to the empirical work by Marin (2004) on the eﬀects of trade and investment with candidate
countries on labor market outcomes in Germany and Austria. Using ﬁrm-level data, Marin (2004) shows that the
enlargement indeed lead to overall small net job losses in both countries over the transition period.
23Table 5: Inﬂuence of economic factors on bilateral opinions
Dep. Variable: bilateral opinion
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
intcpt 3.75a 18.95 68.69a 59.22a 3.31a 16.15 58.83a 68.70a
(0.42) (13.33) (22.18) (21.86) (0.41) (11.76) (21.50) (22.52)
ln imports/product of GDPs 0.10a 0.13a 0.13a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln imports/product of GDPs (lagged) 0.13a
(0.01)
ln exports/product of GDPs 0.08a 0.16a 0.16a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln exports/product of GDPs (lagged) 0.17a
(0.01)
ln population EU country -0.14a -1.86 -7.41a -6.40a -0.13a -1.47 -6.15a -7.30a
(0.01) (1.48) (2.44) (2.42) (0.01) (1.31) (2.37) (2.48)
ln GDP per cap diﬀerence -0.17a -0.13a -0.20a -0.19a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ln unemployment EU country -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.05
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
ln unemployment CEEC 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
net contribution to EU budget/GDP (%) 0.15a 0.15a 0.13a 0.16a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln beneﬁted from EC membership 0.46a 0.48a 0.42a 0.47a
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
EU countries ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Time eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 864 864 864 777 864 864 864 777
R2 0.152 0.77 0.784 0.835 0.137 0.777 0.79 0.839
RMSE 0.493 0.260 0.253 0.224 0.497 0.256 0.249 0.222
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
a denoting signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
24reported here) has however no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The perceived beneﬁt of the EU membership
has a strong positive inﬂuence on opinions.
In an unreported set of regressions, we include both types of variables (aﬃnity and economic-
related). Some determinants have a very robust inﬂuence conﬁrming the partial analyses from
previous tables. Imports, GDP per capita diﬀerence, distance, UN votes correlation, perceived
beneﬁts from EC membership, and language proximity, all have stable levels of magnitude and
statistical signiﬁcance in the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Note that this robust set of determinants
incorporate both types of explanations outlined above: Some linked to the economic situation, some
linked to aﬃnity factors.
We have identiﬁed in the last two sections a reciprocal statistical relationship between bilateral
opinions and trade. Those results do however lack insights about the causal link in this relationship
and its direction. We now turn to this question.
5 Causality through trade policy
This section will notably try to use the drastic change in trade policy between the two parts of
Europe during the transition process as a way to assess whether the large rise in imports following
this policy change did impact the opinions in EU member countries. In order to go further than
simple correlations, a strategy is to estimate the impact of an exogenous change on trade ﬂows on
bilateral opinions. Exogeneity signifying here that the change in trade volumes would themselves
not be caused by a change in opinions. Trade policy is generally not the ideal candidate for an
instrument. Tariﬀs (and trade policy in general) have been shown to be largely endogenous, because
of the response of governments to demand for protection inside the country (Treﬂer, 1993, is one of
the most famous examples of empirical support of this hypothesis of endogenous protection). In our
case however, this concern has reasonable chances to be irrelevant. Indeed, the change in trade policy
from EU member countries was not dictated by political economy considerations inside each country,
but by the need to respond to the external pressure for membership expressed by CEECs soon after
the changes in political regime. As Baldwin and Wyplosz (2003) recall, all CEECs expressed their
will to enter the EU in the early nineties. In response, the EU members oﬀered a transition period
in which unilateral trade liberalization was a central element. We therefore have the uncommon
experiment of a uniform (across members because of the customs union nature of the EU) and
25quite drastic fall in tariﬀs over that period, dictated by an unexpected and dramatic change in the
international environment, rather than a change in the demand for protection inside each country,
which might of course be aﬀected by a change in opinions. There is an additional dimension to this
change: In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the Union. At that date, they adopted the
common trade policy of the Union, which again constitutes a relatively exogenous change from their
formerly independent trade policy. Finally, note that some variance in tariﬀs exists between CEECs
and between sectors within each CEEC. On the one hand, association agreements were signed at
diﬀerent dates20. On the other hand, the trade liberalization was not uniform across sectors and the
transition period before tariﬀs’ elimination was longer for sensitive sectors.
Guiso et al. (2004) propose instrumentation of their trade and opinion regressions, using history
of war, commonality of religion and genetic distance as instruments for opinions (trust in their
paper). There are some problems with this approach however, linked to the fact that i) the level of
opinions is primarily determined by ﬁxed eﬀects, ii) their proposed instruments seem to have little
explanatory power of bilateral trust. We therefore use a ﬁrst diﬀerences approach here that bypasses
the problem of strong ﬁxed eﬀects determinants in levels. Note however that identifying our eﬀects
solely on the time variation of our data within pairs of countries is quite demanding, considering
the little number of years we have with fully available data. Also, the cross-sectional source of the
relationship between trade patterns and opinions, while badly suited to give insights about causality,
is interesting per se. We will provide IV regressions on ﬁrst diﬀerences using what we consider to be
exogenous and robust determinants of opinions on the one hand (the perceived beneﬁt from the EU,
populations, income per capita diﬀerence, and the net contribution to the EU budget), and variation
in bilateral tariﬀs for trade on the other hand.
Bilateral tariﬀ data are much harder to collect on a large scale than what could be initially ex-
pected, even for such recent years. The main original source is the TRAINS database maintained by
UNCTAD and made more user-friendly by Jon Haveman. These data are available at a very detailed
HS product level. As a ﬁrst step, we use here these tariﬀ data combined with trade and production
data initially compiled by the World Bank trade group and completed by CEPII (Fontagn´ e et al.
2004) to assess the impact of tariﬀs at the 3-digit ISIC level for the sample we are interested in.
Table 6 reports results of those regressions, where the log of imports from each CEEC relative
20March 1992 for ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, May 1993 for Romania, December 1993 for Bulgaria,
January 1995 for the three Baltic States, and January 1997 for Slovenia.
26Table 6: Border eﬀects and bilateral opinions.
Dep. Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intcpt -6.53a -7.90a -7.01a -6.56a -7.61a -7.60a
(0.17) (0.41) (0.48) (0.47) (0.73) (0.74)
ln rel. production 0.72a 0.71a 0.66a 0.67a 0.68a 0.68a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
ln rel. prices -0.82a -0.83a -0.86a -0.92a -0.91a -0.91a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22)
ln rel. distance -0.55a -0.53a -0.47a -0.48a -0.59a -0.59a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
common border 1.16a 1.22a 1.16a 1.17a 1.03a 1.03a
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22)
ln imports of newspapers 0.03a 0.03a 0.04a 0.03a 0.04a 0.04a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln share asylum seekers 0.31a 0.31a 0.32a 0.37a 0.41a 0.41a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
language proximity index -1.66a -1.52a -0.91a -0.95a -0.73 -0.73
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.30) (0.51) (0.51)
ln imports of books 0.05a 0.05a 0.05a 0.03a 0.03a 0.03a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln bilateral opinion 0.32a 0.29a 0.24b 0.48a
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16)
ln bilateral opinion (lagged) 0.47a
(0.17)
ln (1+tariﬀ) -12.06a -12.57a -12.57a
(0.64) (0.94) (0.94)
NTB frequency index -0.31 -0.31
(0.33) (0.33)
EU countries ﬁxed eﬀects no no no no no no
CEECs ﬁxed eﬀects no no no no no no
Time eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 8848 8848 4998 4998 1781 1781
R2 0.352 0.353 0.372 0.414 0.422 0.422
RMSE 2.274 2.272 2.238 2.162 2.192 2.192
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:
a and
b represent respectively statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% and 5% levels. The reported standard errors take into account the correlation
of the error terms for a given importer.
27to internal trade is used as the dependent variable. New trade theory of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
type commands that this variable should be explained by relative production, relative prices, rel-
ative distance, and other components of relative trade impediments and relative preferences (see
footnote 11). Column (1) of Table 6 uses our controls for φij other than trade policy and the con-
trols used in the preceding section of this paper for aij. Bilateral opinions are introduced in column
(2). The estimates on bilateral opinions, are within the same order of magnitude as in the ﬁxed
eﬀects regression of section 4.1. This is expected as both empirical speciﬁcations are derived and
consistent with the same theoretical model, although Table 6 runs regressions pooled over industries
as opposed to regressions on aggregate trade. The price elasticity revealed by the coeﬃcient on
tariﬀs is very high and including tariﬀs in the regression improves substantially the ﬁt, supporting
the idea that the change in trade policy was important in the changes of trade patterns of CEECs
during this period. Results remain unchanged when we consider the lagged value of bilateral opinion
(column 6).
The next step is to look at regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences, in order to assess the impact of
the change in trade ﬂows within a pair of countries following the trade policy change on bilateral
opinions. Due to missing observations for tariﬀs and in order to have relatively similar time periods
for regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences, we consider here only the years 1992, 1997 and 2001. Column
(1) in Table 7 uses the change in bilateral tariﬀs as a determinant of the change in trade volumes.
These trade volumes are divided by the product of both partners’ GDPs. The tariﬀ variable has the
expected inﬂuence and coeﬃcient. The price elasticity estimated from change in tariﬀs is smaller
than in the preceding table although still large (recall that Table 7 runs regressions on aggregate
trade, while Table 6 uses industry-level data). In column (2), the change in bilateral opinions is
explained by ﬁrst diﬀerences in the most signiﬁcant explanatory variables from the last section.
Results reveal an expected impact of changes in the population of EU country, the diﬀerence in
GDP per capita between the two countries, perceived beneﬁts from the EU membership and aid
received. Column (3) includes the impact of bilateral opinions on trade volumes whereas column
(4) introduces bilateral trade as an additional determinant of changes in bilateral opinions. Both
variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. This result reveals that the relationships between
trade and opinions from the preceding sections are in fact due to cross-sectional variation. The last
two columns provide estimates of IV regressions, in order to investigate the eﬀect of more exogenous
28shocks to trade and opinions on each other in the within dimension studied here. Equation of column
(1) is used as the instrumental equation for the change in trade patterns in column (6). In column
(5), instruments for the evolution of bilateral opinions are the variables used in the estimation of
column (2). Both coeﬃcients of trade and opinions rise when instrumented. Results suggest that
an increase in bilateral opinions for a given pair of country has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on
imports, when instrumented, whereas column (3) reveals that the impact of opinions is not signiﬁcant
in the absence of instrumentation. The inﬂuence of imports on opinions is never signiﬁcant. These
results can be interpreted as ﬁrst evidence that the impact of a rise in opinions causes imports
to increase, whereas a change in imports has no measurable impact on opinions in the importing
country. Caution is warranted however in interpreting those results, due to the small sample size
available here, notably because of the combination of missing opinion and tariﬀ data.
Table 7: Bilateral opinions and EU imports - ﬁrst diﬀerences
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dep. Variable: ∆ln imp/GDPs ∆ln opin. ∆ln imp/GDPs ∆ln opin. ∆ln imp/GDPs ∆ln opin.




(92.00) (16.02) (96.37) (16.46) (107.28) (30.45)

























∆ ln bilateral opinion 0.04 1.14
b
(0.29) (0.51)
∆ ln imports/product of GDPs -0.02 0.05
(0.01) (0.10)
Time eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 219 250 219 227 219 219
R
2 0.048 0.453 0.048 0.514 0.110 0.363
RMSE 0.858 0.174 0.860 0.163 0.888 0.173
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
a,
b and
c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
296 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between opinions in favor of the upcoming Eastern enlargement
expressed by citizens in current EU countries and trade ﬂows between these two regions of Europe.
We use data extracted from the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys published by the European
Commission, which allows to study bilateral patterns of trade and opinions. Two central questions
are investigated: First, do bilateral opinions and trade ﬂows move together even after controlling for
the known forms of proximity existing between two countries? Second, can we go further and assess
in which direction does the causality go?
Our results ﬁrst suggest that bilateral opinions have a statistically robust and relatively large
eﬀect on imports, even when standard and new covariates proxying for proximity between countries
are controlled for. This result holds both when using standard gravity equations and ﬁxed eﬀects
estimations. We interpret this eﬀect as reﬂecting a positive impact of “bilateral aﬃnity” on trade
patterns. The eﬀect on exports is less signiﬁcant and smaller in magnitude, which supports our
interpretation. We also show that it is possible to go some way towards explaining the diﬀerences
in bilateral opinions among our sample. We use several determinants, based on proxies for aﬃnity,
and also on proxies suggested by trade theory and recent empirical work that might explain why
some countries are more reluctant to openness in general and with some partners in particular.
Finally we add country-speciﬁc eﬀects. We show that those country speciﬁcities are important, but
that the economic determinants also seem to matter and in particular bilateral imports which are
positively associated with a good opinion about enlargement. Last we provide a ﬁrst pass at a
causality analysis, which in the case of our sample, shows a stronger impact of bilateral opinions on
imports than the reverse.
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